Three Paths to One State: Polish National Identity under Russian, Prussian, and Austro-Hungarian Occupation after 1863

Research Thesis

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by

Adam Wanter

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Project Advisor: Professor Jessie Labov, Department of Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures

Table of Contents:

Illustrations:

Introduction

After over 100 years of foreign occupation by three different powers, a common Polish national identity was able to emerge and unite the three partitioned areas. How was this possible? What conditions existed that were able to bring together three separate and distinct areas together? This thesis will look into the development of Polish national identity in the three partitioned areas of Poland during the late 19th and early 20th centuries and in particular the role that imperial policy played in its formation.

The purpose of this thesis is to carry out a comparative study of the three partitioned areas of Poland between roughly 1863 and the outbreak of World War I. Specifically, the thesis compares the effects of the three Imperial powers on the economic landscape of each region, as well as the environment in which Polish political thought, specifically different forms of Polish nationalism, emerged, analyzing how that environment help contribute to its development.

This study will look at the attitude and policies of the ruling powers towards the Poles and other ethnic groups in order to gain a better understanding of the impact these policies had on the lives of the Poles. Also under examination are the ethnic and national composition of the partitioned areas and the economic and political status of the Polish population. One question that repeatedly appears is how policy and attitude on the local level differed or mirrored those put forth by the imperial governments. Finally, this thesis will examine the prominent political philosophies present within Poland after 1863 and, specifically, the development of Roman Dmowski's political ideology and Józef Piłsudski's Polish Socialist Party.

The study is divided into four main sections. The first section is a general background that includes the history of the "January Uprising." The goal of this section is to introduce the reader to the relevant period and give the reader a better understanding of the Polish situation and Polish question. Section Two focuses on the demographic composition of the three partitioned areas, including the size of the Polish population within each region, the size of the "dominant" imperial population, and the size of any other relevant minority populations. This section also looks at the economic position of the Polish population within each partitioned area. Section Three breaks down the imperial policies of each region and the effect they had on their respective regions. Here, the economic developments and attitudes and policies of the local governments also play a role. Finally, Section Four details the development of Polish Positivism and explains how this philosophy and related policies set the stage for the new types of Polish nationalism that soon reemerged. This last section ends with an account of the ideologies of Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski, two prominent figures in the late imperial period who would come to define the political landscape of Independent Poland after the First World War.

My study of Poland and its partitions began with works of Norman Davies, and more specifically his work *God's Playground*, a semi-historical, semi-narrative account of Poland from the beginning of the Polonian dynasty to the present. Davies' book takes a rather conventional approach to the study of Polish history, but *God's Playground* and his other works are among the most well known of modern Polish historical studies in English, and play an important role in the scholarship.[1] Many have departed from Davies,

[1] New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

specifically when it comes to examining and analyzing the partitioned areas of Poland. Some of the more prominent and more recent scholarship in the area includes the work of Brian A. Porter, Richard Blanke, Theodore Weeks, Alison Frank, and Keely Stauter-Halsted, which all make at least a brief appearance within the thesis. Porter's work focuses on the intellectual developments within the Russian Partition. His article "The Social Nation and Its Futures: English Liberalism and Polish Nationalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Warsaw," for example, examines the shift by Warsaw intellectuals away from Romanticism after the 1863 January Uprising to a uniquely Polish style of Positivism.[2] The article also examines the foundation of Polish Positivism and questions the claim that such Positivists had truly given up on independence. Blanke's works primarily focus on the German partition and the development or lack of development of a Polish national identity. His book *Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871-1900)* examines the political policies of Otto Von Bismarck and the role they played with the Polish population of eastern Germany.[3] Blanke makes the argument that Bismarck's policies, which he believes were aimed directly at containing the Polish population, had the opposite result and helped strengthen the Polish national element. Weeks' work, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914,* is less focused on the Polish partition and deals more with Russian attitude and policy towards all of its western territories.[4] Weeks argues that the Tsarist government did not actively partake in policies of Russification, while analyzing the political parties that began to emerge within the Duma and their stances towards the Poles.

[2] *American Historical Review,* 101, no. 5 (1996).
[3] New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.
[4] DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996.

While the works of Frank and Stauter-Halsted are not directly related to the focus of this thesis, they provide interesting and useful perspectives on the topic. Frank's *Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia* takes an in-depth look at the oil industry within Austria Galicia, the reasons for its collapse and the effect it had, or lack thereof, on the industrial state of Galicia.[5] Stauter-Halsted's book, *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914,* focuses on the development of Polish peasant identity within Austrian Poland, including the role of the ruling class, the Polish nobility, and the Imperial Austrian government in the construction of the Peasant Pole.[6] She also details the birth of and establishment of a politically conscious peasant class.

Turning to theories of nationalism, there are a few major theorists, representing different fields and approaches that influenced or had an impact on this thesis. The first two are Ernest Gellner and Rogers Brubaker. In *Nations and Nationalism,* Gellner attempts to define and study the phenomenon known as nationalism, and develops a working model of what he believes are the prerequisites for the development and emergence of nationalism and the effects it has on societies.[7] One of Gellner's strongest beliefs is that nationalism can only develop within an industrial society and that mobility is a key factor in the development of nationalism. In Gellner's own words, "The social organization of agrarian society, however, is not at all favorable to the nationalist principle, to the convergence of political and cultural units and to the homogeneity and

[5] Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
[6] Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001.
[7] Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1983.

school-transmitted nature of culture within each political unit."[8] This sentiment, however, is not consistent with the Polish situation. As will be discussed in later sections, Polish nationalism developed in a region that was primarily agrarian and lacked large industrial centers. Gellner also claims that nationalism is the expression of a singular high culture of a certain people. Gellner believes that for nationalism to develop within a society "it must be one in which they can *all* breath and speak and produce; so it must be the *same* culture… and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little culture and tradition."[9] This claim is more relevant within the study, as seen by the importance of the Polish language and culture in the development of the Polish national movements.

The work of Rogers Brubaker offers an interesting and relevant challenge. Brubaker is a sociologist, thus his focus and reasoning differ from that of Gellner with his historical background. Brubaker takes a more personalized stance and argues that the study of nationalism needs to be viewed from an individual standpoint and that we need to understand that ethnic groups and nations are not real entities but social fabrications. Brubaker also claims that we need to be wary of much stock we place in the role of histories and ethnic rivalry in the formation of national identities. [10] This view is relevant in the Polish case when considering the ethnically centered nationalist views of Roman Dmowski and his national democrats.

Finally, in *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories,* Partha Chatterjee offers a strong parallel to the Polish case and the methodology used

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[8] Gellner, 39.
[9] Gellner, 38.
[10] Rogers Brubaker, "Myths and Misconceptions," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 289-291.

within this thesis.[11] Here Chatterjee focuses on the period prior to the "official awakening" of Indian nationalism in the 1880s and instead focuses on the period in which Indian nationalism was beginning to develop within the upper tiers of society. Chatterjee is interested in the development of nationalist thought within the middle class (a group similar to the Polish intelligentsia) and specifically looks at how ideology and identity were developed through culture and literature. The main focus of Chatterjee's work is how the Indian middle class was able to develop its own distinct form of nationalism that was different then the dominant structure around it, in this case that of the Colonial English government. This situation is paralleled within the following study, in the fact that the Polish middle and upper classes were able to develop their own form of nationalism, despite the presence of three distinct imperial governments.

In the context of these different approaches to nationalism, the overall goal of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of the development of Polish nationalism within the three partitioned areas, and specifically, how a semi-coherent and semi-unified sense of national identity was able to develop across three different empires.

[11] Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Section One: Background

By 1863, the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been fully absorbed by the Hapsburg, Russian, and Prussian empires and had been under each empire's sway for over 60 years. Each empire had taken a different approach to how it incorporated its apportioned areas. The Russian empire had divided the territory it acquired during the partitions into two distinct areas: the first area consisted of the territories in the West; the second area was that of the Polish lands. Over the course of the 19th century, the borders of these two territories would shift, but by 1863 the Congress Kingdom[12] and the Western Provinces would emerge. (See Figure 1, map of Russian Poland) The Congress Kingdom was governed by emissaries of the Russian Empire but was not considered to be on the same political level as the Western Provinces or Russia proper. In 1864 the Congress Kingdom was officially incorporated into the Russian Empire and was renamed the Vistulaland. The Western Provinces were handled in a different manner after the partition. The Russian government viewed these areas as belonging to Greater Russia, thus they officially incorporated the land into the empire. Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian nationalism had yet to emerge and Russians, including the imperial government, believed that these people were Russian but had been under the influence of Poles.[13]

[12] Davies, 81.
[13] Weeks, 8.

Figure 1, Map of Russian Poland.[14]



The Austrian partitions of Poland became the territory of Galicia, which by 1867 was an autonomous region within the Hapsburg Empire.[15] As the power of the Hapsburg

[14] Davies 83, map 2.

monarchy started to fade, so did its control over Galicia. (See Figure 2, map of Austrian Poland) Finally, the areas portioned by the Prussian empire would simply merge with Prussia. (See Figure 3, map of Prussian Poland) By 1863 there seems to have been very little friction between the ethnic Polish population and the Prussian governments advances.[16] Polish nationalism was noticeably absent and the Poles that remained were content to be a part of the Prussian Empire. It would not be until Bismarck's rise and the unification of Germany that friction would come about.[17]

Figure 2, Map of Austrian Poland.[18]

[15] Davies, 151.
[16] Davies, 114-116.
[17] Blanke, 7-10,
[18] Davies, 140, map 4.



Figure 3, Map of Prussian Poland.[19]

[19] Davies, 113, map 3.



The year 1863 marks an important year for the development of Polish nationalism and an independent Polish nationalism. This is due to the fact that in January 1863, Poles within the Russian partitions launched a revolt. This was not the first time Poles had

taken up arms against the ruling imperial powers. In 1830-31 the Poles attempted a revolution and, for the sake of brevity here, failed.[20] The "January Uprising," as the 1863 revolt would later become known, had its origins in the romantic ideals of upper classes of the Poles and the repressive and backwards actions of the Russian government. The January Uprising has its direct origins in the actions of Weilpolski and his forced conscription of 10,000 men. This, however, was merely the spark that lit the powder keg. After forced conscription was enacted, the Poles then waged a guerrilla war against the Russian empire and eventually established a separate government. The January Uprising was short lived and ended with the capture of Traugutt, the acting leader of the newly formed Polish government and leader of the revolution, in 1864.[21] In the end the revolution failed in part because the Polish upper class failed to convince enough of the peasantry to join the fight. As E. Garrison Walters observes, "… peasant support was sufficiently strong to keep the insurrection going, but not powerful enough to make the countryside untenable for the Russians."[22] It is important to note that the January Uprising had a minimal affect upon the other partitioned areas. As mentioned earlier, there was little political activity within Prussian area, thus the Uprising was meet by deaf ears. One might expect that the Uprising would meet more success within more liberal Galicia; however, this was not the case. The Austrian-Poles were content with the status

[20] For more information about the 1830-1831 Revolution see R. F. Leslie's *Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830* (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1956).
[21] Davies, 354-360.
[22] E Garrison Walters, *The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 53.

quo and were equally subdued from their own earlier efforts of revolution in 1830. The Austrian Poles had nothing to gain from joining in the Uprising and everything to lose.[23]

The aftermath of the January Uprising affected all of the partitioned areas of Poland but had the largest impact on Russian Poland and Austrian Poland. As one would expect, the Russian response to revolt within their empire was not well received. Any sense or hope of autonomy was stripped away. This is when the Congress Kingdom was abolished and the area was formally incorporated into the Russian Empire as the Vistulaland. The name change was a deliberate attempt to completely erase any lingering sense of Polishness from the landscape. During this period some of the most anti-Polish policies were put into place. The actions of the Russian imperial and local governments will be viewed more in-depth in Section Three.[24] The effect upon Galicia was of a different mold. Due to the harsh conditions and fear of repercussions,[25] many political elites that had operated in Russian Poland fled. Some fled to other parts of Europe but most fled to the more liberal Galicia. Upon arriving in Galicia many of these more radical elites were unhappy with the political environment there, mainly the passive and submissive nature of the Polish nobility and the backwardness of the region. Even though the actual January Uprising had not brought reform or change to Galicia, the aftermath would eventually take the form of new political elites who set up shop within its borders.[26]

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[23] Walters, 88.
[24] Weeks, 97.
[25] A fear that was very real due to the political atmosphere and nature of retribution post January Uprising.
[26] Walters, 89.

The January Uprising had one more effect upon the partitioned areas of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it ushered in a new era of political thinking. Prior to the 1863, most political thinkers both within Poland and abroad that had concerned themselves with the independence of Poland could be classified as Romantic thinkers. They were somewhat anti-Western in thought and drew upon the great history and culture of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[27] The Poles of this early 19th-century era were also deeply enamored with the idea of winning back independence through armed struggle. Since the failed revolt of the 1830s, Russian-Poles kept this hope alive.[28] The January Uprising came to embody all romantic ideals, thus its defeat came to symbolize that such ideals were also inadequate. In its place a new political philosophy would emerge in the form of Positivism with a Polish twist, and the adoption of the method of "organic work." In essence, this philosophy revolved around accepting the political situation the Poles were in and using the avenues available to improve their standing.[29] This transition from Romanticism to Positivism and, eventually, more modern concepts of Nationalism will be discussed later in Section Four. Section Four will also include a more in-depth look at what exactly Polish-Positivism consisted of.

[27] Andrzej Walicki, *Poland Between East and West: The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland*, (Cambridge: Unkraine Research Institute, Harvard University, 1994), 29.
[28] Porter, English, 1473-1475.
[29] Walicki, 28.

Section Two: Composition

The partitioned areas of Poland were not politically or economically homogeneous. Each region was different from one another for obvious reasons and within each region Poles held varying positions. Also present within these regions were the main ethnic peoples of the partitioning power, Jewish populations and other ethnic minorities such as the emerging Ukrainian population and later the groups that would come to identify themselves as Lithuanians, Belarusians and others.

Galicia

Within the former partitioned areas, Poles tended to dominate the landscape. Within Galicia, people who spoke Polish numbered 2,789,748 or a little over 54% of the Galician population in 1890.[30] Along with their slight ethnic domination, Poles within Galicia were relativity well off. 51.9% of the Polish speaking population could read and write compared to only 38.9% who were illiterate.[31] The Polish population within Galicia consisted of mainly landed nobility and gentry. This high position eventually afforded the Poles great political strength and standing within the Hapsburg Empire. Eventually the Poles would become one of the three favored (recognized) ethnic groups within the empire, along with the Hungarians and Austrians. Economically, the Polish-speaking population was strong, or at least relative to Galicia: Polish speakers owned a majority of the land and without a large industrial base, agriculture was dominant within the

[30] S.D. Corrsin, 1998. "Literacy rates and questions of language, faith and ethnic identity in population censuses in the partitioned Polish lands and Interwar Poland, 1880s-1930s." *Polish Review* 43, no. 2,152-153, table II. Data for the Galician region was taken from the 1890 Galician Census.
[31] Corrsin, 154, table II.

territory.[32] This would hold true until the oil boom of the 1880s; however, even this development would not alter the dominance of Polish population within the economic sphere.[33]

The major ethnic rival to the Polish-speaking population within Galicia was the Ukrainian-speaking population. While Ukrainians made up a total of 2,147,336 people or roughly 42% of the population, 76.8% of them were illiterate.[34] Furthermore, most of these peoples were peasants and under the rule or control of the wealthier, land-owning Poles. Even with such large numbers, due to the above factors, and the fact that a Ukrainian national identity was slow to emerge, the Ukrainian population was not too relevant in terms of the development of Polish nationalism.[35]

Finally, the German-speaking population of Galicia was very small. It consisted of only 152,713 people or roughly 3% of the population, though interestingly enough, only 35.1% of the German-speaking population was illiterate.[36] Despite the fact that they represented the imperil culture, German speakers played a very limited role in the lives of the Poles and Ukrainians. After over 100 years of ruling over Galicia, the Hapsburgs had barely made an impression upon the majority of the Polish population.

[32] Walters, 88.
[33] Alison Frank, "Environmental, Economic, and Moral Dimensions of Sustainability in the Petroleum Industry in Austrian Galicia" *Modern Intellectual History* 8,1 (2011), 171.
[34] Corrsin, 153, table V.
[35] Walters, 88-89.
[36] Corrsin, 153, table V.

Congress Poland

Within Congress Poland in 1897 the Polish-speaking population numbered 4,815,099, or a little over 71% of the population.[37] Given that the bulk of Poles in all three partitions were within this area, their place in the political and economic spectrum varied greatly. In general Poles were worse off than they were in Galicia and generally occupied lower ranks: 61.4% of the Polish-speaking population, for example, was illiterate.[38] Politically the Poles were in a rough spot, especially after 1863; while recognized by the Russian Empire, the Poles were generally discriminated against. The Congress Kingdom lacked many of the even minor representative tools of the Russian Empire, such as the rural councils and *zemstovs,* and was one of the most heavily administrated areas of the Empire. The high level of bureaucracy and administration lead to the exclusion of Poles from political life.[39] Economically the Polish population was no better off. Even though Warsaw and Łódź were some of the most industrialized areas of the Russian Empire, the majority of the population "lived on and from the land."[40]

For a better understanding of the entire political and economic landscape of the Congress Kingdom, one must take into account the position of the Jewish population, which numbered 1,321,100 or 15%-20% of the total population.[41]The most important characteristic of the Jewish population is that they dominated the urban areas within the Congress Kingdom. Within each province, the Jewish population never made up more

[37] Corrsin, 155, table V. Data for the Congress Kingdom was taken from the Russian Census of 1897.
[38] Corrsin, 155, table V.
[39] Weeks, 80-83.
[40] Weeks, 81.
[41] Corrsin, 155, table V. The Jewish population figures include all people, whereas total population figures only include those that are over 9 years or unknown age.

than 5% of the rural community--instead Jews dominated cities and small towns and settlements. Within some provinces, such as Łomża, Radom, and Siedlce, Jews made up over 55% of the peoples within cities. Politically, Jews were generally excluded from participating in the political process and were discriminated against; however, the Congress Kingdom was more lenient towards its Jewish population and afforded them greater opportunities than within Russia proper. With the Jewish statue of 1882, the Jewish population was almost on equal terms with the other peoples of the Empire.[42] The boundaries of the Pale of Settlement also played a large role in the distribution and eventual residing places of the Jewish populations.[43]

The Russian population within the Congress Kingdom was very small, and often times limited to a few provinces. In five out of the ten Congress Kingdom provinces, there was no Russian nationality present, or numerous enough to take into account. In only two of the provinces do the percentage of the population even break 4%.[44] Also if one were to look at the total number of Eastern Orthodox peoples within the Congress Kingdom,[45] one can see that they number only 607,121 or less than 8% of the total population.[46] Politically, as mentioned earlier, the Russian population dominated through its use of the bureaucracy, influence from the center of Moscow, and the prejudice towards the Poles that excluded them from becoming involved.[47]

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[42] Weeks, 101.
[43] For more information on the Pale of Settlement see Benjamin Nathans' *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
[44] Weeks, 83, table 2.
[45] Not an inherent indicator of Russianness but one used by Russians to identify themselves (Weeks).
[46] Corrsin, 155, table V.
[47] Weeks, 103.

Within the "Western Provinces" of Wilno, Grodno and Wołyń,[48] the Polish speaking population numbered 353,308 or roughly 8% of the population.[49] This trend continues in the other provinces.[50] The positioning of the Polish population within these provinces is a bit different then that of the Congress Kingdom. Poles were still low on the political spectrum, yet the Polish minority dominated the ownership of land within the region, due to the legacy of the medieval Polish-Lithuanian Jagiellonian dynasty in this area. In 7 out of the 9 Western Provinces small Polish populations of no more the 9% held over 40.6% of privately held land, and within Kovno, Wilna and Grodno Poles held over 50% f the land.[51] While the Poles may not have dominated in numbers of people or political power, they clearly commanded the rural landscape in an area that was predominantly agrarian.

The Russian population within the Western Provinces was much stronger and much more apparent: in 8 of 9 of the Western Provinces Russians made up over 60% of the population, while in 4 of the 9 provinces, Russians made up over 80% of the population.[52] Even though the Russian nationality was strongly represented within the region, it does not mean that they were a dominant economic force. As mentioned earlier, Poles held most of the privately held land, but the closer one got to the Russian border, the more control the Russian population started to exert over property.[53] An interesting side note is the presence of large Lithuanian populations within certain provinces, mainly

[48] Current-day Lithuania and Belarus.
[49] Corrsin, 156, table V.
[50] Weeks, 86, table 5.
[51] Weeks, 86-87, table 5 and table 6.
[52] Weeks, 86, table 5.
[53] Weeks, 87, table 6.

that Kovno and to a much lesser extents Vilna and Vitebsk.[54] Finally, the Jewish population within the Western Provinces was 881,123 or 20% of the total population. Of those, 629,039 resided within Vilno, Grodno, and Wołyn. This large concentration was most likely due to the internal policies governing where Jews were allowed to live within the Pale of Settlement.

Prussian Poland

Statistics concerning ethnic division within Prussian Poland are difficult to come by. The first obstacle is the relative lack of study on the area and the second obstacle is that the numbers that do exist, within the 1885 census, are not wholly accurate due to the Prussian influence upon the numbers: the Prussians were very lenient in who they considered to be Germans, thus the numbers do not accurately reflect the true composition within the region.[55] These numbers are obtained from the 1890 German Census, which are presented in Blanke's *Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871-1900)*, and do not account for individual nationality beyond German. In Pozan (Poznań) Germans numbered only 34%, in Bomberg (Bydgoszcz) 50%, in Marienwerder (Bydgoszcz) 61%, and in Danzig (Gdańsk) they numbered 72% of the total population. It is clear that the even in the areas where the Germans were the minority, they still had to co-exist with a very prevalent ethnic population, most likely Polish.[56] Another interesting aspect to look at is the percentage of land owned, as reported by Gossler in 1885 in a presentation to the German cabinet. Poles owned 51% of the land within Pozan, 42% of

[54] Weeks, 86, table 5.
[55] Blanke, 41.
[56] Blanke, 41-42.

the land in Bromberg, 13% in Marienwerder, and 9% in Danzig. These numbers show that the Polish "minority" had a strong presence within Poznań and Bromberg and were still a minor force within Marienwerder and Danzig.[57] The most important fact to take away from these demographic figures is that the Polish population was still considerable within the Prussian Polish lands, so much so that in some areas it was even dominant.

[57] Blanke, 61-63.

Section Three: Imperial Histories

Russian Empire:

Russian imperial policy concerning the Congress Kingdom was a policy as confused and convoluted as the Russian Empire itself. At no one time did the Russian Empire engage in a purely nationalistic policy aimed against Poles. Yet most of the actions of the Russian Empire were aimed at keeping the Poles in check. Imperial Russia was not concerned with the promotion of Russian nationalism but rather with maintaining the strength and unity of the Empire and position of the imperial bureaucracy. Due to this agenda and the perception that Poles, as well as Jews, were an inherent enemy, Russia and more specially those in charge of the Congress Kingdom, enacted many anti-Polish policies to stem the tide of modernization within the Congress Kingdom.[58]

For most of its existence the Congress Kingdom was a province of the Russian Empire. As detailed in the previous Section, it was not until the January Uprising of 1863 that the Russian government saw fit to officially incorporate the area into the Empire, or saw no choice but to do so.[59] However, even though the Congress Kingdom was officially a part of the Empire, it did not share the bureaucratic advantages of the rest of the Empire. None of the small democratic changes instituted within the Empire by Alexander II made it to the Congress Kingdom, or when they finally did, it was too little, too late.[60] The Russian government and even the delegates within the Duma feared that if they gave any kind of power to the Poles, the Poles would use it to either weaken the

[58] Weeks, 33-35.
[59] Davies, 96-97.
[60] Weeks, 101.

Russian position or weaken the Russian elements in their society. This fear of weakening the Russian element practically explains why the policies of the *zemstovs* were only reluctantly introduced into the Western Provinces and never in the Congress Kingdom.[61]

Another interesting feature of Russian imperial policy was its emphasis on trying to win over the peasantry. Tsar Alexander II and the imperial government saw potential in the Polish-speaking peasants and believed that they could use these non-nationalized people to their advantage. Along with an inherent distrust of the upper parts of Polish society, this devotion to the peasantry led to a policy that was aimed at the rural parts of society.[62] While the peasantry benefited from these policies, they never truly persuaded or won the peasantry over. After the 1863 revolution, 700,000 Polish peasants were given land and became freehold landowners. This was an obvious attempt by Imperial Russia to try and win over the peasantry, yet this effort, like so many others failed.[63]

In some cases, it may be more important to look at what the Russian government did not do than what it did do. For most of their existence, the Congress Kingdom and the Western Provinces were heavily regulated regions of the Russian Empire. Yet with all of this bureaucracy, the regions were never really improved upon. This stems from a multitude of factors. The first is the fact that the Russian government inherently distrusted the Polish middle and upper classes. This distrust, as discussed briefly earlier, was due to the fact that the Russian government believed that Poles were an inherent enemy of the empire. Another aspect that played into this distrust was the very Catholic nature of the Poles and the Eastern Orthodox nature of the Russians. While the Russian

[61] Weeks, 102.
[62] Weeks, 103-104.
[63] Tim Chapman, *Imperial Russia 1801-1905,* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 110.

government was not a nationalistic government or concerned itself, in general, with causes of nationalism, it did identify itself as an Eastern Orthodox nation and a defender of the Eastern Orthodox religion. It generally categorized or identified Russians based primarily on the basis of being of the Eastern Orthodox faith. The Russian government saw the Catholic Church as an enemy and saw the Poles as the agent of this enemy.[64]

The tide started to shift after the 1863 revolution. The Russian government wanted peace and order restored to the region and was determined to have it. After the rebellion, the Russian Empire was determined to reform the Congress Kingdom and weaken the Polish element within it. The re-naming of the Congress Kingdom as the "Vistula land" is important here for it is one of the first acts of anti-Polish policy. Under the reign of Tsar Alexander the II, the Russian government , pursued a policy of peasant reforms, which included the emancipation of the serfs with the Emancipation Decree, the freeing of the State peasants, and the emergence of rural councils, law courts and schools.[65] It was the belief of the Russian government that it could, as noted earlier, win over the peasants and destroy the economic base of the nobility within the Polish provinces.[66] A reform of the local government was also an attempt to give greater powers to the rural communes.[67]

With this very laissez-faire style of rule, most of the governing of the Congress Kingdom was left to the local governance. These governors and generals of the Congress Kingdom would oftentimes follow their own desires and were generally allowed to do so.

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[64] Weeks, 30-35.
[65] Chapman, 90-92,107.
[66] Weeks, 100.
[67] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia 1855-1914* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1961), 79.

Things in the Western Provinces were much worse for the Polish element during this time. The Empire had placed Count M.N. Muraviev in charge in order to take care of the insurrection. Muraviev, who would eventually become known by the Poles as Muraviev the Hangman, enacted a brutal policy that aimed to crush the Polish uprising and strengthening the local Russian element.[68] In 1865 a step was taken by the Russian government to weaken the Poles economically: the Decree of December 1865, which kept anyone of "Polish descent" from purchasing land within the Western Provinces. In conjunction with this decree, large parcels of land that had been owned by insurrectionists were taken by the government and sold.[69]

Meanwhile, in the newly renamaed and incorporated Vistulaland, the decades following the January Uprising were marked by little political development and educational reform. In 1869 the academic freedom of the University of Warsaw was suppressed and the russification of the educational system began.[70] The bulk of the education reform would occur under the governorship of I.V. Gurko, the governor general of Warsaw from 1883 to 1894, and A. Apukhtin, head of the Wars educational district.[71] Even the Polish Szkola Głowna was transformed into a Russian University. After these reforms, many Poles were forced to use underground schools. As a result of this educational reform, by the turn of the century, almost 2/3 of the population was illiterate.[72] The two men worked tirelessly to undermine the Polish element. Apukhtin was so adamantly anti-Polish that his pupils were forbidden to even speak Polish amongst

[68] Weeks, 96-97.
[69] Weeks, 99.
[70] Seton-Watson, 79.
[71] Weeks, 105.
[72] Weeks, 100-101.

themselves. While the two local governors did not enact any new policy or new laws, they merely took advantage of the environment created in the aftermath of the Uprising and the new regime of Tsar Alexander III. Alexander III ushered in a new era, vastly different then Alexander II's more reformed-minded reign: he wanted to strengthen his position and weaken any outside political entities. The main objective of Alexander III's reign was the pursuit of political control and the solidification of the position of the Russian element within the Empire.[73] It is important to note that while Alexander III's reign brought pressure against local nationalities and political independence, Gurko and Apukhtin did not act on any specific policy implemented by the Tsar. Instead, the two men were simply carrying out their own policies. According to Weeks, "the anti-Polish actions of these two men should not blind us to the fact that no new policy was inaugurated during these years."[74] The repressive policies of Gurko and Apukhtin eventually led, in addition to other factors, to the revival of militant nationalist sentiments within the Congress Kingdom.[75] This reemergence of nationalist feeling will be discussed in Section Four.

Imperial policy drastically changed after the 1905 revolution. The imperial government finally realized that its previous actions were not having the desired effects and were actually working against them.[76] The Russian government was determined to open up the political sphere within its Western Provinces. In 1906, the Russian government introduced *zemstovs* in six of the nine Western Provinces. This change was not wholly beneficial to Poles, though, because the main function of introduction the

[73] Chapman, 124-127.
[74] Weeks, 106.
[75] Seton-Watson, 184-187.
[76] Weeks, 108.

zemstovs was to strengthen and empower the local Russian populations.[77] The right to be represented in the Duma was also extended to Poles; they were given more political freedom, but were still under the dominance of the Russians. Also, in July 1905, the use of Polish within states schools was granted, yet it was a small concession due to the fact Polish could only be used to teach Polish literature and Catholic religion.[78]

All of these Russian policies ultimately had the effect of helping to solidify and give birth to new Polish nationalist movements. After the Uprising, many of the Polish political thinkers began to move on from the Romantic idealism of independence through revolution. In its placed they began to adopt an attitude of working within the framework of the system to improve the Polish position. This shift, which is broadly known as Polish Positivism, will be discussed at greater length in Section Four. This active participation within the framework of the Russian government would be relativity short, due to the lack of improvement on the part of the Russian government. As explained above, Russian imperial policy rarely ever focused on improving the condition of the Polish people, especially those within the middle and upper classes. The Russian fear of such groups helped to keep stagnation and backwardness the norm. The only real reforms enacted were limited rural reforms and even these were never done on a large enough scale to truly alter the situation within the province. Finally, these lack of reforms and progress kept Poland from industrializing. Without large-scale industry, Poland's population would remain primarily agrarian and this result in most of its people remaining peasants or tied to the peasantry.

[77] Weeks, 145-149.
[78] Seton-Watson, 232-233.

Austria/Galicia/Hapsburg Empire

Of the three Polish partitions, the Galician province was by far the most tolerant and even accepting of its Polish population. The Polish nobility, who had come to terms with the rule of the Hapsburg Empire by 1831, did all they could in order to convince the Imperial government of their loyalty. This was done for two reasons: the first was to keep political control of the territory in which they had influence; and secondly, to keep control over the lands that they ruled.[79] By 1867 this policy of appeasement and loyalty had paid off for the Poles. With the *Ausgleich* of 1867 the Poles were recognized as a favored minority, a recognition that granted them privileges unheard of within the other partitioned areas.[80] These privileges basically amounted to almost total political control over the province and a semi-autonomous nature. This *laissez-faire* approach by the Hapsburgs allowed for Galicia to be administered solely by Poles, who had maintained their political and social status from the pre-partition era. It also meant that the Imperial government had very little sway within the province and that the Imperial government did very little within the province. The practical result of the privileges granted by Franz Joseph I was "that Galicia enjoyed almost complete autonomy."[81]

The real source of policy, as mentioned above, was that of the local Galician government. By 1883 the Diet of Galicia had power over agriculture, forestry, public health, and education; even the Imperial post designated as a representative of the Emperor was usually a Pole.[82] Another source of local government was that of the rural communities. Even with the introduction of imperial and provincial governments, local

[79] Walters, 88-89.
[80] Davies, 141.
[81] Seton-Watson, 189.
[82] Seton-Watson, 189.

communities tended to rely upon older and already established structures. According to Hugh Seton-Watson, "…rural communities devised methods for regulating their own affairs, many of which continued to function even after formal governmental bodies and official organizations came to the countryside."[83] This self-reliance would eventually prove disadvantageous to the rural communities due to the fact that it would keep them isolated from the larger picture and allowed political elites to keep power.

Beyond the political ramifications of these policies, another important aspect was their economic impact: by 1887, 81% of the Galician province consisted of peoples still considered peasants. The nobility had effectively shut the door on economic development, thus preserving their own hold on power. This also meant that they had put a halt to modernization.[84] Even where Galicia was ripe for modernization, such as the areas that contained rich oil fields, it was kept from properly developing. The economic policy within these areas was poor and short sighted.[85] Those in charge of the oil fields did everything in their power to produce as much oil as possible in as short as time as possible. No long-term plan was ever constructed and the only motivation was profit.[86] The local elite supported these policies because it only strengthened their position. They were able to put up a guise of modernizing, without truly changing the landscape in which they functioned. Austrian mineral rights were based off the "rule of capture" and the Austrian government was loath to challenge this precedent.[87] According to Allison Frank, the mining of oil

[83] Stauter-Halsted, 32.
[84] Davies, 145-146.
[85] Frank, Environmental, 171.
[86] Frank, Environmental, 172-173.
[87] Frank, Environmental, 174.

> was a purely political decision that had nothing to do with either the technological demands of petroleum extraction or the economic structures most favorable to the production of inexpensive fuel. On the contrary, it was a strategy designed to encourage Galicia's landowning political elite to support the imperial government in Vienna. For those landowners, the primacy of private property ownership (not nationalism) was the first principle of politics.[88]

Another important aspect of these policies was that it stalled the development of internal nationalist movements. The majority of Austrian Poles had no desire for independence due to the fact that they were satisfied with the current status quo.[89] Furthermore, without a large middle class, no separate internal political movements could come to exist. Internal nationalist movements faced this same challenge, along with the fact that a large percentage of the population was not Polish but Ukrainian.[90] While the atmosphere within Galicia did not promote the development of indigenous political movements, it did provide a safe haven for political exiles from the other partitioned areas, due to the high standing and relative freedom of the Poles in this region. This open environment would eventually lead to the development of political movements that had external origins—to be discussed later especially when we look at Roman Dmowski and the development of his nationalist party in Section Four.

While the Galician region might not have been as replete with Imperial activity as the other two regions, it is just as important. The hands-off nature of the Hapsburg Empire provided a the perfect crucible for the development of Polish national and political movements, though these movements had their spiritual and intellectual origins outside of the region. The freedom granted by the Imperial government to the Poles was invaluable. It provided a safe haven for political elites from the other partitioned areas,

[88] Frank, Environmental, 175.
[89] Walters, 88-89.
[90] Illustrated earlier in Section Two on Composition.

which would eventually lead to the strengthening of Polish nationalist causes and the development of nationalist and more modern political movements within Galicia. Two of the more prominent pre-war political organizations, the National Democrats and the Socialists, both had their base of operations within Galicia.[91] This proximity to the other partitioned areas and their close proximity to Polish populations gave them an advantage when attempting to establish legitimacy. This, along with the development of these two parties and their respective leaders will be discussed in more detail in the following Section. In the end, the Austrian policy of appeasement might have been the most effective at deterring the establishment of the radical revolutionary nationalist movements seen in Russia, but it would not fully deter the development of nationalist movements. Instead it would create a fertile environment in which political thought could grow and eventually flourish.

Prussian-German Background

The area partitioned by the Prussian Empire was much different then that of its two counterparts. Prussian-Poland, which would eventually become a part of the newly formed Germany, was distinctly less autonomous then the Austrian or Russian partitioned areas. This area, according to Walters, is seen as the least dynamic of the three partitioned areas and as a place where there was very little political intrigue, due to the fierce nationalization programs to be described below.[92] While this view may have merit at first glance, it is on the whole untrue.

[91] Seton-Watson, 189-191.
[92] Walters, 56.

Prior to the unification of Germany, Prussian policy within the partitioned areas was very hostile towards Poles. The Prussian objective was to put down any hope of resistance or thought of revolution. After the 1830 revolution in Russian Poland the Prussian government succeeded in this policy. Any sense of Polish national sentiment was generally diffused and the Polish population continued to exist within the framework of the Empire. Political life for Poles was very limited within the Prussian Empire and was at times non-existent due to the fact that the Prussian government had taken measures to weaken the existing nobility and replace it with that of the Junkers. This strengthened the Prussian position within the partitioned lands and undermined the only real opposition to Prussian Power.[93] By the time of the 1863 revolution, not much of a Polish national sentiment existed within Prussian borders. Walters claims that most Polish nationalists or anyone with the power to do so left the area due to its harsh conditions and unfriendly environment.[94] By the 1860s, Prussian attitudes towards the Poles had not faded but their actions had. According to Blanke, "True, the official position of these representatives remained one of adamant opposition to their situation, but their protestations began to take on routine, *pro forma*, coloration."[95] The Poles within Prussia eventually came to accept their situation and began to try and work with Prussians.[96]

Things would drastically change under the rule of Bismarck, who came to power inherently opposed to Poles and the Polish question. When he became Chancellor in 1871, he would often times take a hard line towards the Polish question. Bismarck

[93] Davies, 114-114, 117-118.
[94] Walters, 56-57.
[95] Blanke, 7.
[96] Blanke, 6-7.

believed that Poles "would remain our sworn enemies as long as they had not been conquered."[97] It is now no surprise that once Bismarck took power within Prussia and, eventually, Germany that he would pursue anti-Polish policies. Bismarck and Germany's nationalism would strongly resemble the ethno-linguistic style of nationalism described by Brubaker.

Attacks on the Polish populations of Prussia began with the appointment of Archbishop Ledochowski, who was a Prussian sympathizer and an anti-Polish nationalist. Ledochowski promoted the German cause, which led to tensions between the Church and the minority Poles.[98] Bismarck's first and real attack on the Polish population came with the enactment of the Kulturkampf in 1871. The original premise of the Kulturkampf was to combat the Catholic minority presence within the Prussian Empire, but it was also used by Bismarck to put pressure on the Polish minority, which happened to be largely Catholic.[99] In addition to sponsoring the Kulturkampf, Bismarck also put in place other anti-Polish policies such as the School Supervision Law, which put all schools, private or public, under the supervision of the state. This had an impact upon the Polish population because it kept Polish priests out of the educational system and also kept the Polish language out of schools.[100] In 1876 Polish was banned from being used in public offices and in 1877 it was excluded from use within Courts.[101]

Bismarck brought the Kulturkampf to an end in the 1880s, yet his campaign against the Polish population continued. Blanke suggests that Bismarck "would have

[97] Blanke, 8.
[98] Seton-Watson, 188.
[99] Blanke, 20.
[100] Blanke, 21.
[101] Seton-Watson, 188.

ended the Kulturkampf much sooner had he been able to have one policy towards the Church in German areas and another in the Polish provinces."[102] In 1885, Bismarck ordered the expulsion of some 30,000 Russians. These "Russians" were resident aliens, yet a large chunk of these Russians were actually Poles who had come across the border to work as farm hands. These expulsions continued into 1887. By the time the expulsions finally ended, more than 29,000 people had been removed from the Polish provinces.[103] In 1886 Bismarck enacted the Settlement Law, which granted public funds to help German citizens buy land within the Polish provinces.[104] These anti-Polish policies tapered off with the decline of Bismarck but only for a short period of time. By 1894, with the conclusion of the German-Russian tariff war, anti-Polish policies would begin again with renewed vehemence. By 1899 a "policy of extermination" was beginning to form with the goal of removing the cultural and economic presence of the Polish population. These anti-Polish policies would continue right up till the outbreak of World War I.[105]

It is important to note that even with all of these policies, the Prussian and German governments were never able to completely stamp out the Polish presence within its borders, especially when one looks at the composition of the region as seen in Section Two. For instance within the cities of Pozan (Poznań), Bromberg (Bydgoszcz), Marienwerder (Bydgoszcz),, and Oppeln (Opole) the Polish population increased at a greater rate then the German population. And in the case of Pozan and Bromberg, the

[102] Blanke, 30.
[103] Blanke, 46-48.
[104] Seton-Watson, 188.
[105] Seton-Watson, 188-189.

percent of the province that was German decreased.[106] It is also equally important to note that the policies did work in some areas, such as is the case in Masuria.[107] Finally, however, the Prussian and German governments were able to keep the Polish national movement in check. Of all the partitioned areas, the Prussian area shows the least amount of an outward national movement. This could be due to the highly involved Prussian government or the lack of real political power, as evidenced by the fact that the Polish provinces did not receive the right to be represented in the Reichstag in 1872 like most of the other provinces.[108]

The policies enacted by the Prussian-German government had the effect of solidifying the Polish nationality within the region and helping to keep the Polish culture alive within the partitioned areas, while at the same time keeping the active national movements in check. This would be important because it would become one of the foundations for Roman Dmowski's political ideology. Political oppression and strict controls along with the nationalist policy of the Germans forced or convinced political elites of the Poles to leave Germany for safer and greener pastures, which left the nationalist movements with few leaders and left the movement underdeveloped. Germany was not a kind place for Poles, especially Poles with nationalist dreams. The economic position of the Poles within Prussian-Poland also played a role. Most Poles were peasants, farmers, or alien residents brought over to help with farming. While a middle class existed, it was very limited, due mainly to the anti-Polish policies and pro-German policies enacted. The most important aspect of the Prusso-German example is that even

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[106] Blanke, 40-43.
[107] See Richard Blanke, "'Polish Speaking Germans?' Language and National Identity Among the Masurians" *Nationalities Papers* 27, no. 3 (1999).
[108] Seton-Watson, 189.

with anti-Polish and pro-German national policies, Polish culture and language was able to survive and in some sense thrive. While a singular nationalist program did not develop, the people within the Prussian-Polish lands would be ripe and willing participants when the time came to join a national cause.

Section Four: Political Ideologies and Political Figures

Polish political thought leading up to the 1863 uprising, is often described as Romantic, however, this title does not do the views of the Poles full justice. Polish-Romanticism sprung from Insurrection of 1830-1831 and the 1791 Constitution of May 3rd. Its primary focus was that of glorying the achievements of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and bringing about the renewal of this great Kingdom through any means necessary, but primarily through armed struggle.[109] One of the main emphases of Polish Romanticism was that it, as Andrzej Walicki puts it, "… stubbornly hoped that the Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants would join the Polish revolutionary movement and freely define themselves as 'Political Poles.'"[110] Due to this tie to a multiethnic nature and the fact that Polish society did not match that of the West, which was focused on industrialization and, at the time, constitutional monarchism, Polish Romanticism had a very anti-Western feel to it. The most important point to take away from the Polish Romantic era, in regards to this thesis, is its dependence and desire for revolutionary action. The Romantic Poles believed that they were not only fighting for a free and independent Poland but for a better world. They believed that it was Poland's destiny to take down the old order of the world and bring about enlightenment. It was because of this view that "the Polish national cause was made inseparable from the commitment to a

[109]Walicki,15-20.
[110] Walicki, 23.

revolutionary destruction of the corrupt 'old world.'"[111] This desire for revolution would eventually spark the 1863 January Uprising.[112]

1864 marks an important turning point in the context of political thought amongst Poles in Russian Poland. By 1864, the January Uprising had been crushed and, as explained earlier, Imperial Russia was not pleased with the Polish lands. Imperial Russia, formally and informally, went about punishing the Poles for their actions and was determined to set a tone that would prevent future uprisings and conflicts. It was specifically this atmosphere and the failure of the revolution itself that eventually gave birth to a new political ideology. This new ideology would come in the form of a unique style of Positivism known as Polish Positivism. According to Porter, Polish Positivism:

> was more than *laissez-faire* economics, "bourgeois" values, social modernization, and anticlericalism…The Warsaw liberals removed the nation from the political mode of discourse within which it had been embedded for decades and transposed it to a social framework.[113]

Romantic ideals and failed revolutions had left the Poles with a backward state and still no freedom. The Polish Positivists would put independence on the back burner in favor of a socially active and modernizing policy.

Following Porter's argument, Polish Positivism was strongly influenced by the works of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer and Thomas Buckle. This is an interesting deviation from the traditional, and arguably the most famous Positivist, Auguste Comte. "The Poles found in these authors a combination of liberalism and science that served

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[111] Walicki, 22.
[112] For a more in-depth look at Romanticism and Polish Romanticism, see Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and romantic nationalism: the case of Poland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
[113]Porter, English, 1470-1471.

them well."[114] They used these figures to build a new ideology, one that was lest mired in the past and more focused on Western values. Following Walicki, Polish Positivism was also set on modernizing the ancient Congress Kingdom: while they had a deep suspicion towards capitalist and mass industrialization, due to domination by Germans and Jews within the area, Polish Positivists were largely in favor of industrializing Russian Poland.[115] The movement also moved away from the multiethnic view of romanticism and instead began to define the Polish nation as an ethno-linguistic community. This trend would be important, as it would begin to serve as the foundation of further political movements, most notably that of Roman Dmowski and his National Democrats.[116]

One of the main tenets of Polish Positivism is the concept of "organic work," the idea of abandoning the lofty dreams and ambitions of the Romantic period and replacing it with an ethic of work. As Aleksander Świętochowski, a prominent Polish intelligentsia and Positivist, would put it, Poles needed to

> not expect anything from political revolutions, wars, treaties, the shifting favors of foreigners, but let us trust only our own vitality. Let us occupy all vacant positions, let us penetrate all gaps, let us strike roots wherever we find propitious soil.[117]

Positivist work revolved around participating within the framework of all open avenues. This included working with the Russian government, a sentiment that had not previously

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[114] Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland*, (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 47.
[115] Walicki, 29.
[116] Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate*, 57. For a more in-depth look at Polish Positivism see Blejwas Stanislaus, *Realism in Polish politics: Warsaw positivism and national survival in nineteenth century Poland*, (New Haven: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984).
[117] Aleksander Świętochowski, "Political Directions," in *For Your Freedom and Ours: Polish Progressive Spirit from the 14th Century to the Present*, ed. Krystyna M. Olszer, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1981), 122.

been very popular.[118] The end goal of Polish Positivist thought and the ideal of organic work was not independence, but improving the condition of the people. Polish Positivist thought had to move away from independence, but it is important to note that it did not move on from the dream, it merely put this aside in order to focus on more tangible and, according to its beliefs, more productive ventures.[119]

By the 1890s things would begin to change again within the world of Polish political thought. Polish Positivism and its policies had been in place for over 20 years, yet the status quo and conditions within the Congress Kingdom had remained mostly the same. Even with the active participation of the Polish intelligentsia, the Russian government had done very little in way of reform within the Kingdom. This lack of progress, or at the very least the perception that progress had not been made, coupled with the growth and maturation of a generation of Poles who had not suffered through the consequences of 1863 Uprising, opened the door for the emergence of new political thought.[120] This new political thought would be that of nationalism, however, it would not take on a singular form, or an almost singular form, the way that Positivism or even Romanticism had.

Polish nationalism by the turn of the 19th century emerged in two prominent forms. The first was the ideology of the National Democrats or *Endeks*, dominated by Roman Dmowski. The second major force to emerge was that of the socialists, characterized further by two distinct groups: the socialist school of thinking tied to Rosa Luxemburg and The Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP), and the Polish Socialist

[118] Porter, English, 1480.
[119] Porter, English, 1479-1483.
[120] Walicki, 43-44.

Party (PPS). The SDKP operated primarily outside of Poland and its goal was not of Polish nationalism, but for a traditional class revolution. The PPS is, more important within the framework of this thesis. In 1906 the PPS split into the PPS-Left and PPS-Revolutionary Faction. This study will focus on the PPS- Revolutionary Faction and, primarily, its leader Józef Piłsudski.[121]

Prior to the development of these two parties, it is worth noting the importance of the Krakow Conservatives, who formed the intellectual backdrop of Austro-Hungarian Galicia in the late nineteenth century. The Krakow Conservatives can best be described as a school of thought or a loose association of like-minded individuals who were the physical embodiment of the Polish Positivist movement. While mainly active in the 1870s and 1880s, they continued to function into the 1890s and beyond, but in a limited capacity. In line with Polish Positivist thought, discussed earlier in this Section, the Krakow Conservatives promoted "organic work" and later would be proponents of "triloyalism."[122] They were also very skeptical of the May Constitution and the "gentry democracy" it had tried to set up, and in line with Polish Positivism, were pro-Western and adamantly against Slavophilism.[123]

Those affiliated with the Krakow Conservatives can largely be categorized into three groups: landowners, intellectuals, or both. Some of the more prominent people affiliated with the Krakow Conservatives were Jożef Szujski, Walerjan Kalinka, and Michał Bobrzyński. All three of these were university men who had great influence in the politics of Austrian partition; both Szujski and Bobrzyński were known for their

[121] Walicki, 43-45.
[122] Alvin Marcus Fountain III, *Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology 1895-1907* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980), 3.
[123] Walicki, 33.

historical works on Poland.[124] It would be from this political tradition that the two following political parties would emerge yet it would also be against the political ideologies of the Krakow Conservatives and Polish Positivism that the two forms of nationalism would develop.

Dmowski and the Endekcja

Roman Dmowski was born August 9, 1864 in the Warsaw suburb Praga and was born into the petty gentry or *szlachta*. Dmowski grew up in Russian Poland and attended the Jagiellonian University in 1877. Throughout his university years, Dmowski showed distaste for the Russian educational system and the Russification process; however, he would not enter the political arena at this time.[125] In 1886, Dmowski enrolled at the Russian University in Warsaw and pursued studies in biology and other natural sciences. It was during this period that Dmowski would start becoming involved with political matters, but only in a limited sense.[126] In 1889 Dmowski joined the Liga Polska, marking the moment when Dmowski's life focus would shift away from education towards active political participation. With this shift towards political life, Dmowski needed a new arena in which to operate. The conditions in Russia did not promote political thought and discussion, thus Dmowski set off for the Austrian Partition, a place in which he would be afforded great political freedom. The Liga Polska, founded in 1887, would eventually

[124] Fountain, 3.
[125] Fountain, 1, 8-11.
[126] Fountain, 12.

become the National Democrats and, in the process of this transformation, Dmowski's party.[127]

Dmowski's political ideologies consisted of two main tenets. The first of these was the forging of a new political and nationally conscious Pole. Dmowski looked at the national policies of the British and Germans with awe. He respected and admired the strong and nationally conscious middle classes of the two nations. Dmowski looked at Poland's past and critically judged the Poles and their character. According to Alvin Fountain:

> Dmowski believed that the Poles were passive, waiting for the action to come to them… they were now generally thought of as belonging to the 'softest and meekest of nations in Europe, much inclined to a carefree life.' They were known as a 'feminine' people.[128]

Dmowski wanted to change this character and decided to do so through his policy of "integral nationalism." Integral nationalism was a severe critique of the national past and a program of radical modernization of the national character. Dmowski would not settle for half-Poles, or simple patriotic attitudes. He believed that in order for a truly free and independent Polish state to not only re-emerge but also survive, a new Polish national character must be built, and this was only going to occur with unwavering commitment.[129] This policy was not class sensitive; his only desire was for a committed Pole. Dmowski did not want to strengthen the nobility, for he believed that they were at the root of Poland's current situation, nor did he wish to elevate any one class above another.[130] Also present within this policy was Dmowski's stance on the Jewish element

[127] Fountain, 16-21.
[128] Fountain, 90-95.
[129] Walicki, 51-53.
[130] Fountain, 92.

within the Polish lands. Dmowski felt that the Jews would not be open to the idea of assimilation and that an assimilation of a large number of Jews would undesirable, for Dmowski believed they lacked the necessary character qualities he was looking for.[131] It is important to point out that while Dmowski's ideology was infused with anti-Semitism, he was not a proponent of a radical elimination of the Jews. His anti-Semitism arose from the fact that he viewed the Jewish element as foreign and believed them to be a roadblock in the development of Polish nationalism.[132] At a gathering in Edinburgh he was asked:

> "Why is there such a dislike of Jews in Poland? The Jews are the salt of the earth. It is necessary to court them." At that Dmowski cut in: "I will not go into whether they are salt of the earth or not. Salt is a good condiment and if added to a soup in measured amount it brings out the taste. But if too much is poured in, no one can finish the soup."[133]

A related factor in the development and forging of the new Pole was Dmowski's admiration of the German Poles. Dmowski claimed that "[The Prussians] have instead rendered us a service of historic importance, namely they have created in their area the circumstances which speeded our transformation into an active society."[134] He admired the German Poles for fighting back against the nationalist advances of the Germans, and firmly believed that the German Poles should serve as the model for the new nationalist Pole.[135]

[131] Fountain, 108-109.
[132] Fountain, 110.
[133] Fountain, 110.
[134] Fountain, 94.
[135] Fountain, 94-95.

The second tenet was that the Germans were the biggest threat to the survival of Polish nationalism. In a lecture given at Cambridge University in 1916,[136] Roman Dmowski stated that

> All three parts of Poland had their own political struggle, but a close analysis of the political situation of the whole of Poland revealed to the Polish leaders the following facts: first, that the greatest danger threatening the national existence of the Poles came from Germany; for the German view was that… they must destroy not only the Poles in German Poland but must look to the future destruction of the kingdom of Warsaw.[137]

Dmowski believed the Germans would go and had gone to great lengths to destroy Polish nationalism. Dmowski feared and admired German nationalist policy because he understood it well, due to the fact that he had modeled his own nationalist policy off of it. He understood that the German nationalism must destroy all other threats to its hegemony in order become dominant.[138]

While Dmowski feared German intentions, he was firmly of the belief that the Russian and Austrian empires were of no real threat to the Polish nationalism. Of the Austrian Partition, Dmowski thought that the Poles "lived throughout the last fifty years in conditions most favorable to the progress of national culture," while Russian nationalist policies did not truly threaten the Poles.[139] Dmowski was also in the camp that insisted that Russia would play a major role in the survival of Poland, especially against the advances of German interest.[140] One final important aspect of Dmowski's policy is its anti-militant nature: Dmowski was firmly against the use of violent means, at least under

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[136] It is worth pointing out that this lecture was given during the heaviest fighting of World War I, thus it could have, at least partly, influenced the opinion given.
[137] Roman Dmowski, "Poland, Old and New" in *Russian Realities & Problems*, ed. J.D. Duff, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917), 116.
[138] Dmowski, 118-120.
[139] Dmowski, 107-108.
[140] Walicki, 52.

the contemporary circumstances. He believed that the use of violence would only serve the Imperial powers because it would give them an arena in which they could simply use their superior strength to crush the nationalist movement. Dmowski concluded that building a nationalist movement through forging of a new character would be a much harder thing for the imperial governments to combat, let alone destroy.[141]

Piłsudski and Polish Socialism

The other prominent political ideology at the time was that of Piłsudski-style Socialism. As mentioned earlier, two basic camps emerged in the late 1880s and early 1890s, the socialist party of Rosa Luxembourg and the more national Polish Socialist Party. For the purposes of this thesis we will examine the PPS and more specifically the role and writings of Józef Piłsudski. Piłsudski was born December 5th, 1867 north of Wilno, also into a *szchalata* family. Like Dmowski, Piłsudski's upbringing was relatively privileged and Piłsudski was afforded the opportunity to seek higher education. Significantly, Piłsudski's mother was, in his words an "irreconcilable patriot" and that she "did not even try to hide from us the pain and disappointment that the failure of the rising caused her."[142] During Piłsudski's education he would learn to dislike the Russian elements within Poland and in general. He would learn to hate that lack of Polish history and culture within the classroom and, above all else, the way the Russians gave him "the feeling of being a slave who can be crushed like a worm at any moment."[143] This upbringing might explain why Piłsudski's brand of socialism carried with it such strong

[141] Fountain, 117-120.
[142] Józef Piłsudski, *The Memories of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier*, trans. D.R. Gillie, (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1931), 10-11.
[143] Piłsudski,12-13.

nationalist feelings. Piłsudski began his ascent into socialist thought during his university years, but it was during his exile in Serbia for the attempted assassination of the Tsar Alexander III that he truly committed himself to the socialist cause. When his exile ended, Piłsudski set out for Galicia, where he believed he would be able to make the biggest impact.[144] As described earlier, Galicia provided the perfect environment for political activity for Poles due to the relatively open environment and favorable conditions for political expression.

As mentioned, Piłsudski's brand of socialism differed from the standard type popular at that time; Piłsudski was not merely trying to ignite the revolution of the proletariat but was attempting to use the unification and revolution of the working class to create an independent Poland.[145] Piłsudski believed that "The socialist in Poland must aim at the independence of his country, and the independence is the obvious condition for victory of socialism in Poland."[146] Another component of Piłsudski's socialist platform was its very anti-Russian stance, whereby the Russian empire and by proxy the Russian people were the enemies of the Poles. He did not think that there was any way an independent Poland and independent Russian state could co-exist.[147] Instead, Piłsudski looked towards the Germans, but more specifically the socialist elements within the Germany and its Riechstag. He believed that the more liberal Germany would be a greater ally to the Poles and the Poles plight for independence and socialist agenda.[148]

[144] Piłsudski, 27-29.
[145] Walicki, 44.
[146] Piłsudski, 27.
[147] Piłsudski, 27.
[148] Walters, 138.

One last important aspect of Piłsudski's ideology and the ideology of the PPS is their desire and support for armed insurrection and revolution. Piłsudski and the Party were fully in favor of igniting and supporting a revolution that they believed would help bring about the independence of Poland and their socialist platform.[149] In Piłsudski's words, the goal was to be the

> turning (of) every party and, above all the socialist, into an organ of physical force; an organ, to describe it in terms odious to our 'Humanitarians' (hysterical girls who can't bear to hear glass scraped but let you spit in their faces) of superior brute strength.[150]

This fomenting of revolution is very noticeable during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Shortly after the war broke out, Piłsudski traveled to Japan in an attempt to offer aid to the Japanese in exchange for political considerations for Poland. Events transpired that kept the Japanese from supporting the PPS, but not for lack of effort by Piłsudski.[151] The PPS also played a prominent role within the 1905 revolution, though it did not bear the result they had hoped for.[152]

The impact of the imperial powers within each partitioned area is most notable when looking at the development of political ideologies that lead to different forms of nationalism. Each partitioned area was able to provide a significant piece that helped shape one of the nationalist ideologies described above. The ultra-nationalist policies of Germany, discussed earlier, provided the perfect environment for the forging and strengthening of a Polish national identity that was resistant to the nationalist efforts of the Germans. This new identity was focused on survival and determined to persevere.

[149] Weeks, 116.
[150] Piłsduski, 161.
[151] Seton-Watson, 321-323.
[152] Seton-Watson 232.

When pushed up against the wall, the Polish minority responded, creating what would eventually serve as a model for Dmowski-style Polish nationalism, one based on ethnicity and hegemony. The Russian partition, where the bulk of the Polish population could be found, was relatively backward politically and economically; the Russian government did enough, while not doing too much, to create a situation in which no rival Polish nationalist movements were able to develop. Specifically the lack of political expression and political repression forced or prompted most political elites, like Dmowski and Piłsudski, out of Russia and into Galicia, where conditions were much more favorable. The hands off nature of the Hapsburg Empire created the perfect situation in which political exiles from both the Prussian and Russian partition could congregate and develop singular and unified political platforms.

Conclusion

By the beginning of World War I, the partitioned areas of Poland still remained separated and, prior to the outbreak of the war, had very little hope of achieving the dream of independence. Yet, even though the tangible result of independence may have seemed far off, the Polish people, mainly the upper and middle classes, had begun laying the foundation of future national movements. The period between 1863 and 1914 was a critical point in the development of the national philosophies and identities that would eventually emerge in force during the inter-war period. Each partitioned area was able to provide a vital piece in what would eventually emerge. In my final estimation, it was almost a benefit to the development of Polish nationalism that Poland was partitioned into three separate empires. While each empire provided a vastly different experience for each Pole, yet, the Polish middle and upper classes were able to capitalize upon all of these experiences and develop a comprehensive sense of national identity. Each region contributed to this in some way, whether it was the building of and ethnically-defined national character in the German partition, the preservation of Polish culture and identity within the Russian partition, or--possibly the most important factor in terms of forging a national identity--the politically free atmosphere of Galicia which provided the Polish elites with a political forum to express and propagate its newly formed ideals.

In Section Three I looked at the policies of each partitioned area, focusing on the attitudes of the imperial governments and how they affected the policies they put in place for or against the Poles, as well as the role and attitudes of local governments towards the Polish population. Interestingly, each imperial government took a different approach to its administration of its Polish lands. The only imperial policy that can be deemed a

success, when one considers its original intent, was that of the Hapsburg Empire, yet even it did not fully succeed. The policies of nationalization put in place by Bismarck and the German government, were clearly unable to eliminate the sense of a Polish identity among the Polish minority within its borders. In some regards these policies actually strengthened the Polish element within the German Empire.

The Russian Empire was just as unsuccessful with its policies. While the Russian government never truly implemented an anti-Polish policy, its agenda was to win over the peasantry, weaken the elites within Poland, and make the Polish population subservient to the Russian rule. The Russian government failed in winning over the peasantry, who remained for the most part politically and nationally opposed to Russian influence. The Russians had more success in limiting the role of the elites, but were incapable of keeping them in check. This is evidenced by the two revolutions during this period, one in 1863 and, more importantly, 1905. The Tsarist government was never able to appease the Polish population, even when it relaxed its policies and was willing to work with Poles within the framework of the empire. The lack of political and economic reform, along with the continued Russification policies implemented by local governors, eventually led to disillusionment with the Russian Empire and a return for the desire of independence.

Finally, the Hapsburg Empire succeeded in gaining the loyalty of the local elites and promoting the interest of the Hapsburg Empire through its hands off nature and support of the old Polish nobility. Yet, in the end, even this did not work. In fact it would be this hands-off nature that would eventually lead to the failure. The *laissez-faire* style of the Austro-Hungarian Empire created an environment that eventually fostered the development of nationalist political ideologies and ideals. While the Hapsburgs were

able to gain the loyalty of the established elites, they were unable to keep out the eventual influx of a new Polish intelligentsia who would come to dominate the region. Once the new elites arrived, it was too late for the Hapsburg Empire to make the necessary changes to keep the Galician region from fracturing along with the rest of the multiethnic empire.

In Section Four I analyzed the development of Polish Positivism, Roman Dmowski's ideology and Piłsudski's nationalist brand of socialism. The most important conclusions from this section is the importance of Galicia, as mentioned above, and the freedom it provided to the development of these ideals, specifically Dmowski's and Piłsudski's thinking, and how the experience and circumstance of this period helped lay the foundation for the future Polish nationalist movements. It might be useful to return to the theories of nationalism of Gellner, Brubaker, and Chatterjee, and consider how they apply to the Polish situation now that the specific circumstances have been examined. When looking at Gellner's theory, the most obvious thing that comes to mind is the development of a singular high culture within the three partitioned areas even though these areas did not meet the industrial criteria prescribed by Gellner. However, Gellner's concept that a single high culture needs to exist is clearly present. Without the interaction of all three areas and the common experiences they were able to share across borders, a singular Polish identity would not have been able to develop. Had each of the partitions been more thoroughly cut off from one another, it is highly possible that three distinct national movements could have developed. The ideas of Brubaker are less apparent in this period, but his assertions still resonate. Brubaker's argument about the development of nationalism along ethno-linguistic lines is spot on when looking at the national ideologies of Roman Dmowski. Furthermore, Brubaker's skepticism of the importance of

ancient history holds true in the Polish case: had ancient histories truly been a determining factor in the development of nationalism, we would expect the reemergence of a unified Polish and Lithuanian national identity, yet, clearly this did not happen. Instead Polish and Lithuanian nationalism developed along their respective ethnic and linguistic differences. Finally, the parallel with Chatterjee's work is clearly present within Section Four. In both cases the intelligentsia played an important role in the cultural and philosophical development of national identity and nationalist movements. Also, in both cases the intelligentsias were able to generate specific forms of nationalism for their local situation that had not previously been imagined.

This thesis has introduced a new way of understanding Polish national identity by analyzing the partitioned areas of Poland in a comparative field. Previous studies all simply treated each individual partition as if it were a singular actor, and not the dynamics that arose between them. I believe it is important to look at how all three partitions affected one another, for it is clear that the ultimate effects of the imperial policies on national identity are interconnected. The importance of this era for the development of modern day Poland and modern day Polish nationalism cannot be understated. Future areas of scholarship could focus on the lingering distinctions of how Polish identity is constructed in these three regions or the eventual disappearance of these distinctions. Other scholarship could detail the legacy of Dmowski and Piłsudski's ideologies and the impact they had on inter-war Poland and post-Soviet Poland. Finally, one could trace the specificity of the nationalist attitudes described above, and how they are still present today in Polish politics.

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